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Abstract 
To date, work on the development of assurance cases 
has largely been concerned with the broad structure 
and content of arguments to contextualise the data. 
However, at a more detailed level, use of natural 
language in an argument can lead to conflicting 
terminology, to difficulties in understanding the 
nature of the claims being made or to logical 
inferences which are obscure to the readers of the 
argument. This problem has become increasingly 
complex as more and more suppliers are involved in 
the development chain, making it more difficult to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of assurance 
data or to re-use it. This paper explores the 
development of controlled vocabulary and structured 
expressions for CPS in the automotive domain, using 
the Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business 
Rules (SBVR) to improve communication and to 
provide presents some formal consistency checking of 
content. We highlight the challenges this work has 
exposed. 
Keywords: safety, assurance, controlled language, 
SBVR, automotive. 
1   Introduction 
The presentation of assurance cases is now standard 
practice in a number of safety-critical domains and is 
mandatory in several. Assurance cases typically comprise 
both reasoned arguments justifying claims relating to the 
safety, integrity and/or dependability of CPS and a variety 
of supporting evidence – analysis and test data, design 
information and process documentation. Although a 
considerable body of literature regarding safety-case praxis 
has been produced, the primary focus to date has been to 
provide guidance on the structure and content of the 
arguments, with relatively little attention paid to the 
language used to convey them. Graphical notations 
developed for the safety assurance domains (for example, 
the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [1] and the Claims-
Argument-Evidence method [2]) inevitably foreground – 
and simplify – issues of logical flow and the overall 
readability of the argument, but provide limited guidance 
on how assertions and supporting statements should be 
phrased to ensure that the argument is correctly conveyed 
to a reader or assessor. In the GSN Community Standard 
[1], for example, less than 10% of the document is devoted 
to language issues as opposed to the definition, graphical 
representation, construction and review of argument 
structures. In practice, many assurance cases are not 
documented using graphical notations, but use either 
natural language alone or a combination of natural 
language and graphical notation for summary purposes.  
Imprecise phrasing in assurance cases can lead to a number 
of problems, including: 
• Inconsistency – terms may be used with different 
meanings at different points across an argument. 
This may lead to uncertainties in interpretation, 
particularly in the subjects of claims and 
assertions and the scope within which they are 
valid. 
• Vagueness – without a precise definition of 
terminology, the author’s intended meaning may 
not be properly conveyed to the audience, whether 
because there is no shared understanding of the 
terms used or because there is a failure to ‘pin 
things down’ adequately. 
• Lack of focus in claims – in freeform text, it can 
be difficult to ‘unravel’ sentence structure so as to 
establish the scope of terms, i.e. how they 
influence other terms beyond the single phrasal 
structure in which they occur [3]. It can therefore 
be difficult to identify the claims the argument is 
making, since the relationships between the 
elements under discussion may not be made clear. 
CPS are increasingly assembled by integrator 
organisations, using multiple components from a diffuse, 
multinational supply-chain [4]. Compositional approaches 
to certification mean that assurance data relating to discrete 
components need to be collected and matched to form an 
integrated system argument. There is a clear need for 
consistent usage of domain- and system-specific 
terminology throughout the supply-chain, and for a shared 
understanding of the nature and limitations of the claims 
and evidence being presented in the argument, and of the 
assumptions made about the operational context in which 
component behaviour is guaranteed. 
We believe there is scope to use controlled language to 
provide more rigorous rhetorical structure in assurance 
2  Template for  Ada User Journal  
Volume 22,  Number 1,  March 2001 Ada User Journal  
cases for CPS. We propose a dual approach to address the 
problems of inconsistency and imprecision outlined above. 
First, we address semantic aspects by developing a domain 
dictionary, which provides unambiguous definitions of 
relevant concepts in the domain over which the argument 
ranges. Secondly, syntactic aspects are addressed by these 
definitions to specify claim types in the form of structured 
expressions to clarify the argument logic. The OMG’s 
Semantics of Business Vocabulary and Business Rules 
(SBVR) specification [5] offers one means to implement 
this approach. SBVR provides for the formalized definition 
of domain concepts, together with the rules and 
assumptions which define the relationships between them. 
It contains an explicit model of formal logic, and thus 
provides a means for the capture of natural language 
expressions in a formal structure, suitable for machine-
processing. 
Two of the elements defined in SBVR are of particular 
significance for our approach: ‘concepts’ and ‘fact types’. 
These form the basis for the development of the controlled 
lexicon and claim typology described in the two following 
sections. 
2   Argument semantics: development of a 
controlled lexicon for safety assurance 
In SBVR, a ‘concept’ is defined as “a unit of knowledge 
created by a unique combination of characteristics” [5]. 
Generally, this equates to a noun, or a noun-phrase (also 
referred to as a ‘term’). In SBVR, concepts can be defined 
formally or informally. In a formal definition, each of the 
concepts referred to must be defined elsewhere in the 
vocabulary, thus making for a closed lexicon. Reserved 
terms to represent logical relationships between concepts 
are defined in [5]. The “General Concept” and “Concept 
Type” attributes can be used to specify hierarchical type-
relationships between concepts. This is especially useful in 
the disambiguation of terminological mismatches in cross-
domain “translation” scenarios, such as the comparison of 
concepts across different safety standards. 
Our work in the OPENCOSS project [6] defined a 
preliminary SBVR vocabulary of concepts for assurance 
arguments. As in the SBVR specification [5], a graphical 
summary of concept relationships is provided for ease of 
reference (for human readers). The vocabulary provides a 
controlled language definition of concepts, artefacts and 
processes used in the domains of interest of OPENCOSS 
(railway, avionics and automotive), and thus provides a 
basis for comparison of usage between the domains. We do 
not seek to develop a unified, universal lexicon for 
assurance to be used across the target domains. Such an 
enterprise is fraught with difficulty, since the certification 
approaches differ fundamentally. As an illustration, 
consider the difficulties for a manufacturer seeking to reuse 
software developed according to IEC 61508 [7] in an 
avionics context, where certification to DO-178B is 
required [8]. An assurance argument in the original context 
– here expressed using SBVR, for clarity – might assert 
that “software module Y is developed to safety integrity 
level SIL 4”. In the avionics context, the manufacturer may 
wish to make a similar claim: “software component Y is 
developed to design assurance level DAL A”. Since both 
the safety integrity level and the design assurance level are 
instantiations of the generic SBVR concept “Criticality 
Level” defined by OPENCOSS, it might be assumed that a 
direct ‘translation’ between the claims is possible. 
Examination of the diagrams summarizing the concept 
relationships for system and software architectures 
extracted from the SBVR vocabulary we have developed 
for the relevant standards, however, reveals that the 
situation is more complicated. 
 
Figure 1 IEC 61508 software concept relationships 
 
 
Figure 2 DO-178B software concept relationships 
In IEC 61508, a SIL is directly attached to a (software) 
safety function which is modelled at system level.  In DO-
178B, however, the DAL is associated with a software 
system or component, and does not address the “function” 
concept at all.  This implies that direct ‘translation’ of the 
claim cannot be made – it is not possible to convert a SIL 
directly into a DAL without considering the extra process-
related concepts that arise because of the focus in DO-178B 
on the design of the system, rather than merely its 
functionality.  Although a clear understanding of the 
terminology can be helpful in addressing this difficulty, 
what is required is not a definition of individual concepts in 
isolation, but an appreciation of the interrelationships 
between the concepts, since these provide constraints on 
reuse of the claim – and associated assurance data – here.  
Use of a closed SBVR vocabulary will ensure that these 
interrelationships are correctly identified.  We should 
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therefore consider there to be either a “partial map” or a 
“no map” relation between the concepts, and a full 
explanation of the discrepancies between the conceptual 
structure of the standards is required in order for an 
engineer to make informed decisions about the feasibility 
of or limitations on reuse, and on what extra assurance data 
may need to be provided in the DO-178B context. 
A primary concern for the OPENCOSS project is to 
support reasoning about whether certification artefacts, 
such as analysis results, can be reused across domains and 
from one development project to another. In order to 
support this, the OPENCOSS vocabulary defines 
terminology at three levels of abstraction: we define 
vocabulary models to capture the generic vocabulary of 
safety standards relevant to the domains, organisation-
specific terminology and project-specific terminology. 
Mapping relationships between concepts are used to 
capture traceability relationships between generic and 
system-specific concepts (e.g. the fact that a project-
specific test plan is an instance of the test plan defined in 
the organisational model) and also to indicate the degree of 
“mapping” between concepts at the various levels (e.g. the 
degree to which the organisational definition of a test plan 
matches the characteristics of the generic artefact defined in 
the standard model and relating to a requirement of the 
standard). 
The demonstration of assurance is a much wider and more 
complex concern than simply establishing conformance to 
a standard; and an argument is much more than a 
compliance checklist of processes and artefacts.  Having 
clear definitions of terminology in which concepts are 
related both vertically by type and sub-type relations and 
horizontally by being defined in terms of one another in a 
closed lexicon can help in ensuring consistency of 
reference across assurance case modules.  In particular, the 
terminology can be used to characterise the interfaces and 
interdependencies between argument modules, and to 
ensure that the terms of reference here are consistently 
understood.  The layered vocabulary defined for the 
OPENCOSS project allows us to clarify the relationships 
between standards, industrial praxis and development 
projects, using the “mapping” relationships between 
concepts at the various levels of abstraction to make any 
gaps between standards’ requirements and projects’ 
actualities clear. 
3   Argument semantics: structured claim 
types 
One important means of maintaining consistency in the 
natural language used to convey the reasoning in an 
assurance argument is to specify types of claims.  A 
taxonomy of claims can be superimposed on the general 
concerns of an argument structure identified in the 
literature (e.g. [9]) and can then be used to refine the 
logical structures provided in the argument fragment 
templates captured in GSN patterns such as those presented 
in [10]. The claim types characterise the types of concepts 
which are discussed in a particular part of the argument, 
and the features which are asserted in claims. We have 
identified several generic claim types for assurance 
arguments, as summarised in Table 1: 
Claim Type  
Definition 
 
Activity-Artefact Claim 
Claim relating to the production of 
particular artefacts as a result of particular 
safety analysis or development activities.  
Artefact Compliance 
Claim 
Claim relating to the presentation of a 
particular artefact necessary for 
compliance. 
Artefact Adequacy Claim 
Claim relating to the adequacy and 
appropriateness of a particular artefact, i.e. 
moving beyond compliance to a 
justification of the evidence artefacts 
provided. E.g., the adequacy of a fault tree 
Activity Compliance 
Claim 
Claim relating to the presence and features 
of features of a safety analysis or 
development activity necessary for 
compliance 
Activity Adequcy Claim 
Claim relating to the adequacy and 
appropriateness of a particular safety 
analysis or development activity 
Component Development 
Claim 
Claim relating to the adequacy and 
acceptability of the process by which a 
component has been developed 
Fault Accommodation 
Claim 
Claim relating to the accommodation or 
elimination of a fault 
Hazard Mitigation Claim 
Claim relating to the adequacy of hazard 
mitigation achieved by safety measures in 
the design 
Table 1: Generic claim types for assurance  
We can exploit the layered structure of the OPENCOSS 
vocabulary – where concepts are defined and “mapped” at 
the level of the standard, the industry model and the project 
– by defining domain-specific versions of these claim types 
in parameterised phrases used to populate the GSN 
argument patterns.  These phrases can then be instantiated 
in component- or system-specific arguments using 
vocabulary relevant to that component derived from the 
project vocabulary model.  The “Concept Type” 
mechanism in SBVR allows for the presentation of a series 
of potential instantiations of a given parameter from which 
the user can choose. In some cases, the “fact Type” 
mechanism in SBVR allows to generate the domain-
specific claim type directly from the standard or industry 
vocabulary model. 
The “Fact Type” in SBVR [5] is used to capture 
relationships between concepts defined in the vocabulary.  
A fact type is defined in [5] as “the meaning of a verb 
phrase that involves one or more nouns, whose instances 
are all actualities”. A fact type thus equates to a proposition 
ranging over the concepts represented by the nouns or 
noun-phrases, a statement of some relationship which can 
be evaluated logically as having a truth value. As with 
concepts, fact types can be defined formally – by means of 
a closed expression in which every term is defined 
elsewhere in the SBVR model – or informally, using 
terminology which is not controlled.  
In some cases, the “fact type” mechanism in SBVR allows 
us to generate the domain-specific claim type, and the 
mapping between the standard (or industry) vocabulary and 
the project vocabulary provides possible terms with which 
4  Template for  Ada User Journal  
Volume 22,  Number 1,  March 2001 Ada User Journal  
the template phrase can be instantiated. For claims of the 
Activity-Artefact type, for example, the SBVR vocabulary 
derived from the terminology used in the safety standard 
should identify the types of concept over which the claim 
might range, by identifying relationships between particular 
activities and the artefacts they generate. A generic fact 
type of the sort artefact is generated by activity, for 
example, can be instantiated by traversing the SBVR 
“Concept Type” and “General Concept” fields in the 
standard-level vocabulary to identify a series of individual 
concepts of type “artefact” and type “activity”/ The list of 
possible concepts might be further reduced by pre- and 
post-conditions relating to the individual “artefact” and 
“activity” concepts  identified in the project-level model, to 
present the argument developer with a list of candidate 
terms with which to instantiate the fact types reflecting the 
practice of the project.  More complex fact types might be 
devised – around the basic claim structures – to reflect 
complex dependencies between activities. 
4   Example 
In this section, we present a simple example to illustrate the 
ways in which structured expressions using controlled 
vocabulary can be exploited to instantiate claims in an 
assurance argument. The example is based on a simplified, 
fictitious automotive anti-lock braking system (ABS), 
which is developed to ISO 26262 [11]. Correct operation of 
the ABS allows the wheels to maintain contact with the 
road surface during hard braking, preventing the wheels 
from locking and avoiding an uncontrolled skid. The 
system comprises a software controller, four wheel sensors 
(one for each wheel) and two hydraulic valves (one for 
each axel). The system has two basic operational scenarios. 
The software constantly monitors the speed at which the 
wheels rotate, measures via the wheel sensors. If it detects 
that one wheel is rotating at a slower speed than the others, 
the controller actuates the hydraulic valves to reduce 
hydraulic pressure to the brake, thus reducing braking force 
on that wheel and allowing it to turn faster. Alternatively, if 
the software detects that one wheel is turning significantly 
faster than the others, the valves are operated to increase 
hydraulic pressure to that wheel, thus increasing braking 
force to that wheel and slowing down its rotation. The 
software controller contains a critical function to calculate 
the hydraulic pressure demand value from the wheel speed 
sensor inputs. Failure of this function results in the 
incorrect braking force being applied to the wheel, which 
could result in a skid. 
The assurance argument for the ABS software controller 
clearly needs to address the issue of potential faults in the 
hydraulic pressure demand calculation function.  In this 
example, that issue will be addressed as part of a top-down 
argument concerning the mitigation of the “uncontrolled 
skid” hazard by the software. An argument of this type can 
be structured using the approach suggested in the high-level 
software safety argument pattern in [10], which is 
presented in Figure 3, using the GSN [1]: 
 
Figure 3 High-Level software safety argument pattern 
(from [10]) 
In the diagram, the rectangular boxes represent claims made 
about the software (these are called “Goals” in GSN).  The 
top-level goal (Goal: SWSystemSafe) contains an overall 
claim that the software is acceptably safe to operate within 
the system in which it is located ({system Z}).  The rounded 
rectangles attached by hollow arrows to this goal contain 
contextual statements required to further explain and 
validate the goal.  Here, they refer to supporting 
documentation which provides descriptions of relevant 
aspects of the software design and the design and 
operational environment of {system Z}. The triangles 
underneath items indicate that textual information within 
curly braces requires instantiation in an argument relating to 
a real system. Goal:SWSystemSafe is refines into a lower-
level claim (captured in Goal: swContributionAcc), which 
indicates that the argument will be made by considering the 
possible contributions that {software Y} could make to 
system-level hazards.  The oval (Ass:hazards) represents an 
assumption on which this argument relies: in this case, that 
all of the system hazards have been identified correctly. The 
parallelogram (Strat:swContributionAcc) represents the 
strategy used to break down this general claim into more 
detailed ones. Here, the argument is structured by taking 
each of the system-level hazards to which the software may 
contribute in turn, and arguing that the software contribution 
to each has been managed.  This strategy is realised in the 
statement of Goal:Hazard, which makes the claim that the 
{software Y} is acceptably 
safe to operate within 
{system Z}
Goal: SwSystem 
Safe
{Description of 
{software Y}}
Con: Sw
{Description of 
operating context of 
{system Z}}
Con: OpCont
{Description of 
{system Z}}
Con: system
The contribution made by 
{software Y} to {system Z} 
hazards is acceptable
Goal: 
swContributionAcc
All system hazards 
have been correctly 
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Ass: hazards
A
Argument over each 
hazards to which 
{software Y} may 
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Strat: swContribution Acc
{Description of hazards 
to which {software Y} 
may contribute}
Con: hazards
Software contribution(s) 
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managed
Goal: Hazard
{Description of the ways 
in which {software Y} 
may contribute to 
{Hazard}
Con: contributions
Number of hazards 
to which the software 
may contribute
Argument over each 
identified software 
contribution to {hazard}
Strat: contMit
The ways in which {software Y} 
may contribute to {Hazard} are 
completely and correctly 
identified
Goal: contident_contident
contident
{software contribution} to 
{Hazard} is acceptably 
managed
Goal: sw contribution
number of identified 
software 
contributions 
to {Hazard}
n
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software’s contribution to a particular hazard ({Hazard}) is 
acceptably mitigated. An enumeration of the relevant 
hazards is provided as context to this argument, and is 
referred to in the GSN Context (Con:hazards).  The solid 
circle on the decomposition arrow between 
Strat:swContributionAcc and Goal:Hazard indicates that 
Goal:Hazard and the subsequent argument is iterated for 
each of the hazards to which the software might contribute.  
Where a safety requirement exists which relates to the 
software’s role in {Hazard}, this is explicitly stated, and 
referred to in the context Con:safetyRqt. Since software 
might contribute to the occurrence and effects of hazards in 
a number of different ways (depending on the nature of the 
hazard, the software and the system context), a further 
strategy (Strat:contMit) is applied, by which the claim 
concerning the safe management of these software 
contributions (captured in Goal:swContribution) is made 
and argued through for each potential contribution.  This 
line of argument is made in the context of an enumeration of 
the potential contributions the software could make to the 
hazard (referred to in Con:contributions).  Further 
confidence in the adequacy of the argument at this point is 
provided in a backing argument, which supports a claim that 
the list of potential software contributions to the hazard is 
complete and correct.  This argument is made in a separate 
GSN module (contident), the structure of which is not 
outlined in full here.  Goal:contident_contident provides a 
reference to the topmost claim in that backing argument, 
and serves to direct the reader’s attention to the argument 
and evidence provided in the contident module. 
Our discussion of the use of the SBVR vocabulary and 
claim types to develop and instantiate an argument draws on 
the lower part of the pattern in Figure 3, the claim in 
Goal:Hazard that the software’s contribution to a particular 
Hazard is adequately managed and the subsequent argument 
addressing each potential way in which the software could 
contribute to the hazard. 
The example requires two distinct SBVR vocabularies. 
Firstly, the ABS system is represented in a vocabulary, 
terms in which are drawn from the organisational 
vocabulary for the system as a whole. Concepts in this 
vocabulary serve to define concepts in the deployment 
context of the ABS software. The ABS software is also 
represented by a dedicated, project-level, vocabulary. 
Figure 4 contains a restatement of the argument 
structure, which represents a partial instantiation of the 
template pattern presented in Figure 3, as an assurance 
argument for the ABS software. Here, Goal G1 represents 
an instantiation of Goal:Hazard in Fig. 3. Contexts C1 and 
C2 and G:backing_top are also instantiations of the parallel 
elements in the GSN pattern.  The underlined terms here 
(“ABS software”, “uncontrolled skid hazard”, “safety 
requirement 123”, “fault tree analysis”) are instances of the 
more generic concept types used in Fig. 3, and are taken 
from the SBVR vocabulary for the ABS system (populated 
from project documents at the system level, such as system 
descriptions, requirements documents, system safety 
analysis).   
 
Figure 4 Restatement of lower portion of software safety 
argument pattern, indicating claim types 
The claims captured in the statements in Goals G2, G3 and 
G4 represent standard-level representations of the generic 
claim types “Fault Accommodation Claim” and “Hazard 
Mitigation Claim” identified in Table 1 above.  Here, they 
are parameterized with generic noun types drawn from the 
SBVR vocabulary for ISO 26262.  These claims have an 
underlying conceptual model, which derives from ISO 
26262, and relates a typology of faults to fault mitigation 
measures and characterises the relationship between faults 
and hazards
1
.  This model, and the SBVR definitions for the 
concepts it identifies, are presented in Figure 5: 
 
 
 
SBVR Concept Definitions 
fault 
Definition: abnormal condition that can cause failure of an 
element or an item  
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.42 (adapted) 
Possibility: fault causes at least one failure 
                                                            
1
 Note that ISO 26262 [11] identifies an additional subtype of fault, the 
concept “permanent fault”.  This concept requires a claim of a different 
type from those used to handle the other fault types, and it will be more 
difficult to make those claims generic.  In order to simplify the discussion 
here and focus on the use of SBVR to populate generic claims, we have 
excluded “permanent fault” from the illustrative example here. 
Software contributions to 
the uncontrolled skid 
hazard are appropriately 
addressed
G:1
ABS software safety 
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contribution to 
uncontrolled skid 
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Argument over each 
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uncontrolled skid 
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S1: 
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relating to software contribution 
to uncontrolled skid hazard
C2:
The ABS software fault tree 
analysis relating  the software's 
contribution to uncontrolled skid 
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G:backing_top
backing
{fault of type systematic fault} is 
adequately mitigated by {fault 
mitigation measure}, which 
partially addresses uncontrolled 
skid hazard
G2
{fault of type transient fault} is 
adequately mitigated by {fault 
mitigation measure}, which 
partially addresses uncontrolled 
skid hazard
G4
{fault of type intermittent fault} is 
adequately mitigated by {fault 
mitigation measure}, which 
partially addresses uncontrolled 
skid hazard
G3
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permanent 
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intermittent 
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systematic  
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hardware failure
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6  Template for  Ada User Journal  
Volume 22,  Number 1,  March 2001 Ada User Journal  
 
permanent fault 
Definition: fault which occurs and then stays until removed or 
repaired 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.88  
General Concept: fault 
 
intermittent fault 
Definition: a fault which occurs repeatedly and then disappears 
Source: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.42 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.42 note 2 
General Concept: fault 
 
systematic fault 
Definition:  fault which causes a failure which is manifested in a 
deterministic way and which can only be prevented by applying 
process or design measures 
Source : ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.42 (adapted) 
Dictionary Basis: : ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.131 (adapted) 
General Concept:  fault 
 
safety measure 
Definition: activity or technical solution put in place to avoid or 
control systematic failures and to detect or control random 
hardware failures or to mitigate effects of such failures which 
may lead to harm 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1 §1.110 
Necessity: safety measure includes safety mechanism 
safety measure is specified in functional safety 
requirement  
Example: definition of software without the use of global 
variables 
Synonym: means; control 
 
failure behaviour 
Definition: termination of an element’s ability to perform a 
function as required or intended 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.39 (adapted) 
 
systematic failure 
Definition: failure which can be attributed deterministically to a 
certain cause, and which can be eliminated only by a change to 
the design or manufacturing process, to operational procedures, 
to documentation or to organisational factors 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.130 (adapted) 
General Concept: failure 
Necessity: systematic failure is caused by systematic fault 
 
random hardware failure 
Definition: failure that may occur unpredictably during the 
lifetime of a hardware element, according to some probability 
distribution  
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.92 
General Concept: failure 
Necessity: random hardware failure has probability 
 
component 
Definition: element defined at an abstraction level below that 
of “the system”, that is logically and technically separable and 
is comprised of more than one hardware part or of one or more 
software units 
Source: ISO 26262 Part 3, §1 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.15 
General Concept: element 
Necessity: a component must contain at least one hardware 
part or a component must contain at least one software unit 
 
hazard 
Definition: potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning 
behaviour 
 of an item 
Dictionary Basis: ISO 26262 Part 1,§1.56 
 
Fact Types 
fault causes at least one failure behaviour 
 
failure behaviour may lead to hazard 
 
systematic fault may cause systematic failure 
 
safety measure mitigates fault 
 
systematic failure is caused by systematic fault 
 
random hardware failure has probability 
 
component exhibits failure behaviour 
 
hazard has cause 
 
hazard may be caused by failure behaviour which is exhibited 
by component 
 
hazard has effect 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual model and SBVR definitions 
underlying the claim types defined in Figure 4 
 
It will be clear that the first part of the claims in Goals 
G2, G3 and G4 have been derived straightforwardly from 
the conceptual model – they assert the relationship which is 
modelled between the “fault” and “safety measure” 
concepts, captured in the fact type safety measure mitigates 
fault.  Note, however, that the claim generation is not 
automatic – understanding of the concepts of assurance and 
argumentation are required to lead to the concept of 
adequacy in association with fault mitigation, and thus to 
make the claim subjective (as the argument requires).  The 
second part of the claim is not generated directly from a 
fact type or relationship, since there is no direct link in the 
conceptual model between the concepts of fault mitigation 
and the hazard.  Instead, the relationship is obtained by 
traversing the contextual relationships between “fault”, 
“failure behaviour” and “hazard”. In order to produce an 
argument for a specific ABS system, the claim types 
captured in goals G2, G3 and G4 are instantiated by 
populating the parameterized noun phrases with concepts 
of appropriate types from the SBVR vocabulary defined for 
the specific ABS system – the project-level model.  Figure 
6 presents a partial instantiation of Goal G2: 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Partial instantiation of claim type, using project-
specific vocabulary 
 
 Here, Goal G2 from Figure 4 has been instantiated 
twice, populated using instances of the “systematic fault” 
and “fault mitigation measures’ (a synonym for “safety 
measure”) from the SBVR vocabulary for the actual ABS 
system (the project-level model).  Note that the intention 
here is to show the population of the generic claim type 
ABS processor calculation bug is 
adequately mitigated by range 
detection, which partially 
addresses uncontrolled skid 
hazard
G5
ABS processor calculation bug is 
adequately mitigated by trend 
analysis, which partially 
addresses uncontrolled skid 
hazard
G6
Software contributions to 
the uncontrolled skid 
hazard are appropriately 
addressed
G:1
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using concrete instances from the vocabulary, rather than to 
present a complete argument.  As it stands, the GSN 
fragment presented in Figure 6 suggests that the two goals 
G5 and G6, taken together, provide a sufficient argument 
that G1 holds in the context.  Given the richness of the 
argument structure provided in Figure 4, this is clearly 
untrue: further instantiation of Goals G2, G3 and G4 are 
required to ensure adequate coverage of Goal G1.  For 
simplicity, these additional goals (which can be instantiated 
from the SBVR vocabulary for the ABS system as G2 has 
been here) are not shown. 
5   Related Work 
There is only a limited amount of research which directly 
addresses the integration of controlled language approaches 
in the field of assurance argumentation. A methodology for 
argument development is presented in [12], which exploits 
the structural patterns presented in [10]. Generic patterns to 
help form software assurance arguments are also provided 
in, for example,  [13], [14], [15] and [16]. Such patterns 
focus on the structure of the arguments and the issues they 
should address, rather than their phraseology or rhetoric 
and since they are by definition generic, it can be difficult 
to achieve consistency and completeness in the resulting 
argument instantiations. In none of these cases is explicit 
attention paid to the possible application of controlled 
natural language to enforce the patterns and assist the 
argument developer in making the reasoning clearer. The 
standard industry guidance on the development of GSN 
arguments [1] contains some general advice about sentence 
structure and a discussion of common language-based 
errors. These errors are identified at the level of the whole 
claim, rather than individual terms or phrases. 
The OMG’s Structured Assurance Case Metamodel [17] 
provides a metamodel of argumentation, including 
language aspects, and a discussion of the use of SBVR to 
realise assurance arguments. The technique described is, 
however, overly simplistic and is not fully realised in [17]: 
the present paper should be seen as part of an ongoing 
debate as to the utility of SBVR in the assurance 
argumentation field. 
The authors of [18] define a restricted language to describe 
rely-guarantee conditions between software applications 
and computer hardware. Although this language can be 
used in the automated generation of a limited set of 
arguments concerning compositional behaviour of software 
elements, including failure behaviour, it is very limited in 
scope, and does not capture additional required information 
such as data concerning evidence supporting rely-guarantee 
claims or the degree of confidence which can be placed in 
them.  
The OPENCOSS project [19] aims to develop technologies 
to support the cost-effective reuse of assurance information 
within and between safety-critical domains. Assurance 
arguments are used as the basis for communication of this 
information, and to support certification. This approach 
relies on the ability to communicate and compare relevant 
concepts across and within organisations and domains. 
However, there is no consistent conceptualisation and 
terminology to describe and manage assurance, let alone a 
“common certification approach” recognised by system 
integrators, the supply chain and assessors. OPENCOSS 
seeks to provide a basis for communication by developing a 
pragmatic approach, which identifies commonality and 
differences between the ways in which safety, assurance 
and certification are conceived, and provides means to 
compare them. The project has developed models of 
assurance assets, information, processes and concepts in 
safety standards, organisational practices and individual 
projects, using a generic metamodel of relevant concepts 
for safety assurance [6]. These models are supported by 
domain- and company-specific vocabularies which provide 
clear, controlled definitions of concepts which need to be 
addressed in safety arguments. A mapping technique is 
used to define relationships between concepts in both the 
models and the vocabulary at varying degrees of exactness, 
and tool support is provided to support engineers in making 
explicit the significant differences which need to be 
discussed in a justification of reuse.  
Structured approaches to language are widely used in the 
requirements engineering domain. For example, the 
Attempto Controlled English (ACE) defines a structured 
natural language to support engineers in writing precise 
specifications which can be translated into semi-formal 
representations suitable for machine-checking [20]. 
Similarly, Denger et al [21] have identified natural 
language patterns to specify functional requirements for 
embedded systems. The CIRCE project [22] adopted 
model-based techniques to support the validation of natural 
language requirements, based on a lightweight formal 
model. In the safety-critical domain, the CLEAR 
methodology developed by the Dependability Research 
group at the University of Virginia uses insights from 
linguistics and cognitive psychology concerning the nature 
of linguistic error and presents a pattern-based technique to 
minimise miscommunication in requirements [23]. None of 
these methods explicitly address the issues relating to 
structured argumentation for assurance – for example, 
inherent subjectivity in claims -, although the relationship 
between requirements and argument claims appears to 
provide an interesting avenue for future research.   
6   Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the potential use of SBVR 
concept definitions and fact types to add rigour to the 
language used to convey assurance arguments for safety-
critical CPS.  We have described the use of a layered 
vocabulary and “mapping” to capture traceability 
relationships between concepts defined in safety standards, 
in organisation-specific practices and conventions and in 
individual projects, and have indicated how the mapping 
notion can be used to provide informed guidance on the 
transferability of concepts and the reusability of assurance 
assets between projects and across domains. Furthermore, 
we have provided an initial taxonomy of structured claim 
types, partially derivable from SBVR fact types, and have 
demonstrated how they can be used to constrain the 
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language and focus of assurance arguments. Work to 
develop this method and to provide tooling is currently at 
an early stage. Theoretical work remains to be done to 
expand the taxonomy of claim types and refine their 
phrasing. There is also a need to explore the relationship 
between declarative fact types, requirements and argument 
claims more fully, in particular to find ways to address the 
subjective elements of claims in a formal or semi-formal 
lexicon for argumentation. 
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